


**POSTSUBURBAN**

# CALIFORNIA

THE TRANSFORMATION OF  
ORANGE COUNTY SINCE  
WORLD WAR II



EDITED BY

**ROB KLING SPENCER OLIN MARK POSTER**

## Grass-Roots Protest and the Politics of Planning: Santa Ana, 1976–88

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Between 1976 and 1987 tens of thousands of Latinos in Santa Ana, the former urban center of Orange County, organized to oppose the policies of city government that threatened to destroy their neighborhoods and homes. This urban movement developed in three phases. During the early years working-class residents organized neighborhood associations to demand changes in city development plans and enact municipal reform. Undocumented Latino immigrants took the lead in the second phase of grass-roots mobilization. In 1984 tenants organized a rent strike that involved over five thousand immigrants in a struggle to establish and protect their rights as renters. At the height of the strike the third phase of the movement began with the formation of a coalition of tenants, former leaders of the neighborhood associations, and middle-class residents, all of whom united to democratize municipal politics. This coalition was the most radical of similar organizations that had formed in the county by 1986 (discussed by Spencer Olin in Chapter 8) because it grew out of a decade-long urban mobilization and responded to the acute racial and class tensions that characterize politics in this older city.

This chapter examines this history of protest and provides a view of the social world of long-established Latino residents and recent, predominantly Mexican, immigrants, whose community ties provided the foundation for the close-knit neighborhood and block-level organizations that sustained grass-roots political action. The examination of the community basis of grass-roots politics illustrates the conceptual limitations of the postsuburban construct to define the social world of the nonwhite working class in Orange County. Although previous chapters have characterized postsuburbia by its racial heterogeneity, its privatized residential and commercial space, the location of commercial activity in decentralized

multipurpose malls, and the prevalence of new middle-class family practices, this sociospatial organization does not adequately describe Santa Ana. The concept is useful, however, to explain the loss of the city's traditional urban function and to analyze the intent and vision of planners and politicians who introduced elements of postsuburban spatial organization into Santa Ana after 1982. Perhaps most important, the contours of postsuburban society that have been examined elsewhere in this book illustrate the contradiction between larger developments within the county and the experience of most Santa Ana residents. This contradiction fostered the unprecedented mobilization of the city's working poor and undocumented immigrants, heretofore highly marginal groups in urban politics.<sup>1</sup>

The chapter also examines the significance of racial and class prejudices in the planning and politics of postsuburbia. It argues that at each stage the urban movement has acknowledged these biases and that its internal momentum has been gained by the infusion of this political consciousness in different sectors of the population. The particular strategies for this infusion were based on shifts in urban policy and on the rapidly changing demographic structure of Santa Ana. To examine these changes in urban policy and demography in relation to the various phases of the movement reveals the political environment out of which urban protest grew.

In the 1960s and 1970s Santa Ana's urban plans were conceived in traditional ways and focused on expanding or rebuilding the city's existing industrial, administrative, and commercial zones. Redevelopment of the city's urban core fortified the single centralized urban function the city had retained—that of being the county's administrative center.<sup>2</sup> In 1982 Santa Ana began to implement a new redevelopment plan that incorporated 20 percent of the city's territory and that included designs to build multiuse industrial corridors parallel to the freeways, as well as modern corporate convention and hotel centers, and to “revitalize” more aggressively than before the downtown and civic-center area for use by a middle-income residential and commercial population. These plans were introduced well after the formerly small towns of Anaheim, Fullerton, and Newport Beach, and major new cities such as Irvine, had built decentralized spaces for industrial, corporate, commercial, and leisure activity, and had surpassed Santa Ana as growth centers within the region.

Santa Ana's urban planning responded slowly to the county's economic, political, and social reorientation; plans were formulated after Santa Ana had lost its diverse and centralized urban functions and while the city was rapidly losing its socially heterogeneous population. Whereas 36 percent of the county's urban residents, or nearly a quarter of Orange County's population, resided in Santa Ana in 1950, by 1970 only 12

TABLE 9.1 Population of Santa Ana and Orange County, 1930–80

	<i>Santa Ana</i>	<i>Orange County</i>	<i>Santa Ana as % of County</i>
1930	30,322	118,674	25
1940	31,921	130,760	24
1950	45,533	216,224	21
1960	100,530	703,925	14
1970	156,601	1,420,386	11
1980	203,713	1,931,570	10

percent of the county's urban residents lived in the city. Santa Ana contained 11 percent of the county's total population and 26 percent of its Latino population in 1970. After 1970 the rise in Santa Ana's population was due primarily to Latino migration into the city; by 1980, 41 percent of all the Latino immigrants in Orange County resided in Santa Ana. In 1986 the city's population was 62 percent Latino.<sup>3</sup> Contrary to the intent of planners and city politicians, by the 1980s Santa Ana had become the Latino center of the county (tables 9.1 and 9.2).

Because the city's redevelopment plans prior to 1982 focused on the old urban core, they threatened to destroy three well-established barrios. Neighborhood associations organized to contest this demolition. This first phase of the movement (1976–82) also built a political consciousness among the city's established Latino residents, who organized within the neighborhood associations to secure federal funds from the Economic Development Block Grant program for the improvement of services and conditions in neighborhoods and the larger urban area.<sup>4</sup> The 1982 redevelopment plans, which introduced postsuburban design, encompassed primarily unbuilt and commercial space at the city's periphery. Protest against this new phase of urban planning focused on securing an increased share of the tax revenue generated from redevelopment projects for low- and moderate-income housing and on protecting small businesses from removal.<sup>5</sup>

Although the formal 1982 redevelopment plans did not include further demolition of neighborhoods, the city council established a far-reaching code-enforcement program in 1984 intended to change the central city's demography by forcing the largely undocumented immigrant population out of substandard rental units. Opposition to code enforcement was organized by thousands of immigrant tenants. Through a rent strike and litigation, renters sought to make the code-enforcement program work to their advantage by refusing to move from or pay for substandard housing and by demanding that their units be brought up to

TABLE 9.2 Spanish-Surname Population of Santa Ana and Orange County, 1930, 1960–86

	<i>Santa Ana</i>	<i>% of City Population</i>	<i>Orange County</i>	<i>% of County Population</i>
1930	3,633	12	16,536	14
1960	15,372	15	52,576	7
1970	40,421	26	160,168	9
1980	90,646	44	286,331	15
1986	161,129	62	n.a.	n.a.

NOTE: "n.a." means not available.

code. At the height of the rent strike two new groups joined the protest. Latino merchants initiated individual lawsuits and built an organization to contest their removal from the "revitalized" downtown. Middle-class residents organized to fight various adverse effects of city plans that would transform their neighborhoods. By December 1985 a large coalition against city government formed with the objectives of restructuring municipal government and making the city council, planning commission, and mayor more directly responsible to the electorate than they had been. This coalition represented the final phase of the movement. Unlike previous movements, this coalition considered the reorganization of city government a precondition for democratic urban politics and planning.

Grass-roots mobilization, initially fostered by professional organizers using well-trying models, succeeded in gaining tangible victories for immediate objectives and successively brought politically unorganized sectors of the population into the political process, but the movement faced long-term constraints. As a result, victory was commonly followed by the implementation of city plans that undermined the movement's long-range objectives.<sup>6</sup> These constraints were imposed by the political economy of urban growth. The redevelopment agency grew from a relative handful of people in 1973 to being the city's second largest agency a decade later. Taking off in the early 1980s, it incorporated other departments, added personnel and functions, and consolidated its power by 1986.<sup>7</sup> The expansion of the redevelopment agency and its fiscal power is explained by the fact that the redevelopment process became the single most important source of revenue for California cities after passage of Proposition 13 in 1978. (See Chapter 10 for a discussion of the California tax revolt.) Tax-increment revenue from redevelopment areas goes directly to the city and is not used for the city's traditional responsibilities of providing social services. Instead, the revenue backs bonds for infrastructural development and subsidizes a large array of projects for the private sector. Critics argue that redevelopment projects are often fiscally un-



sound.<sup>8</sup> Although they provide the city with a promised tax increment, no guidelines exist to balance the city's outlay of capital and its recovery of that money. In response to urban protest, the State of California increased the amount of tax-increment funds redevelopment agencies must spend on low- and moderate-income housing, but the state has not created the personnel to enforce those regulations.<sup>9</sup> Hence, even while the urban movement in Santa Ana has focused on the need for family housing, the city has met most of its obligation to replace or construct low- and moderate-income housing by building units for senior citizens. And, following the county pattern, Santa Ana has produced more high-income than low-income housing in its redevelopment areas.

The power of the redevelopment agency over the city's fiscal and administrative life has posed an increasingly complex problem for the urban movement. The entrenched racial prejudice of the city's voting population has posed a second problem and thwarted significant political change within municipal government in both 1985 and 1986, when the reaction to grass-roots political activity was directed solely against Latino tenants and undocumented immigrants despite the broad representation of diverse ethnic and social groups in the movement by these dates. Although the momentum of the movement has built in the years subsequent to 1986, the complex obstacles to a democratic urban politics have progressed apace. The following pages thus examine a yet inconclusive chapter in the contemporary urban process.


#### THE SOCIAL BASIS OF THE URBAN MOVEMENT

The high concentration of Latinos in Santa Ana by 1970 is part of a regional social geography that replicates an ethnic segmentation of the working class. Within this class Latinos hold a significant number of the blue-collar manufacturing jobs. The total rise in the county's Latino population after 1960 corresponds to an expansion of the blue-collar work force, which doubled between 1970 and 1980.<sup>10</sup> Table 9.2 suggests the geographical and historical dimensions of this segmentation. The proportion of Latinos in the county by 1980, when Latino blue-collar workers had become one of the fastest-growing segments of the work force, corresponds most closely to the proportion in 1930, when Latinos constituted the principal labor force for agriculture. The ethnic division of the work force that is reflected in the region's geography produced a consistently low level of income for Latino families. In 1966, 50 percent of all Anglos in Santa Ana earned more than seven thousand dollars, while only 26 percent of Latinos, the majority of whom came from families that had resided in the United States for generations, earned that amount.<sup>11</sup> The immigrants' position in the economy has reinforced these trends. By

1977, 88 percent of Orange County's Latino population earned below the median income.<sup>12</sup> Santa Ana has become the primary area of residence for these working poor; it contained eight of the county's ten poorest census tracts in 1980.

The history of this ethnic segmentation helps to explain the social basis of the urban movement. Work-force segmentation has been part of a system of social segregation fought against by Latinos in various social movements dating from the 1920s. Mitigating the adverse effects of this segregation, a web of relationships has developed within the barrios that helps sustain daily life and that spans generations. These ties have been used to build the urban struggle. The first phase of the movement was organized among Latino residents who had lived or continued to live in barrios formed at the turn of the century, when the city's geography was strongly polarized by ethnicity.<sup>13</sup> Between 1910 and 1940 segregation in housing formed part of the systematic segregation of Latinos in the workplace, in "Mexican" elementary schools, and in public life. Postwar economic growth and civil rights action significantly improved most Latinos' economic situations, yet the effect of persistent racism was evident in the virtually unaltered ethnic geography of Santa Ana in 1960, when Latinos resided primarily in or near the long-established barrios and inhabited the old neighborhoods in the city center. During the 1960s this ethnic residential concentration was reinforced (map 9.1). By 1970 eight elementary schools, all located in or near the older barrios and in the city center, had student bodies between 60 and 90 percent Latino.<sup>14</sup> As a new social differentiation of space emerged within the region, Latinos moved into neighborhoods throughout central Santa Ana. By 1975 most of the elementary schools were over 50 percent Latino, and by 1986 only five of the city's twenty-four elementary schools were less than 50 percent Latino, while Latinos constituted 85 to 95 percent of the students in eleven elementary schools.<sup>15</sup> Santa Ana also has the largest black and Asian populations in the county, but Latinos are the numerically dominant ethnic group.

Santa Ana's role as the Latino urban center of the county is further illustrated by comparing its ethnic organization with that of other cities in the county. In 1970 Santa Ana's pattern of ethnic residence and ethnic distribution was similar to those of older Orange County cities and towns. Twenty-six percent of Santa Ana's population was Latino, and other places had comparative distributions: In Placentia 19 percent of the population was Latino, in San Juan Capistrano 18 percent, in Stanton 16 percent, and in La Habra 15 percent. Latinos were everywhere concentrated near the old town centers in well-established barrios. By 1980, however, Santa Ana's Latino population had expanded throughout most of the city, while that in the older towns of the citrus belt remained more



Map 9.1. The geographic concentration of the Latino population in Santa Ana, 1960-80

highly concentrated in ethnic enclaves and grew in relatively smaller proportion to the total population. The proportion of Latinos declined in San Juan Capistrano after 1970, where an expansion of suburban housing for middle- and higher-income residents allowed them rapidly to dwarf the predominantly lower-income Latino population of the small city.<sup>16</sup>

Latinos are drawn to Santa Ana because of the relatively low rents and the established immigrant neighborhoods. The structure of immigration influenced this demographic shift and contributed to the social basis of protest in the 1980s. Immigrants migrate through kinship/friendship networks that determine largely where they settle and that link particular communities in Mexico to settlement cores in the United States.<sup>17</sup> Through these networks immigrants are introduced to potential employers, aided in finding housing and in making medical and educational arrangements for their families, and provided with an emotional and material support system. These networks are present in the older barrios of Santa Ana as well as in the newer immigrant neighborhoods. In Santa Ana's Delhi Barrio, for example, marriage patterns between 1947 and 1979 demonstrated "network endogamy"; 40 percent of the immigrants who married in Our Lady of Guadalupe church had married people from their own or nearby communities in Mexico.<sup>18</sup> Strong links have also been forged between Latinos from the United States and Mexican nationals through marriage.<sup>19</sup>

Immigration to Santa Ana has contributed to the coherence of Latino neighborhoods. Although the rapid expansion of the immigrant population after 1970 and the low wages they are paid produced a scarcity of housing and encouraged the proliferation of slumlords, family life is supported by well-established and interconnected social networks. Moreover, many areas of the city have been restructured by immigrants, and city life has generally been transformed. Between 1970 and 1980 Latino merchants purchased or rented space in neighborhood shopping centers. Latino street vendors selling clothing, fruit, vegetables, and other goods regularly frequented neighborhoods.<sup>20</sup> The downtown area, long cited by city officials and administrators as an example of the city's decline, was revived in 1970 as a commercial and cultural center by Latino merchants. Some of these merchants had first established themselves on East Fourth Street much earlier. The Olivos family presents an exemplary case of how these businesses expanded simultaneously with the growth of the Latino population. In 1938 the family opened a Spanish-language cinema downtown. In the early 1950s they bought one of the city's largest theaters, and by the early 1980s they had purchased all the downtown theaters to show Spanish-language films. Two Spanish-language newspapers were published and widely distributed in Santa Ana by 1980.<sup>21</sup> The important

place of Latinos in Santa Ana's contemporary urban life is underlined by the policies of Police Chief Ralph Davis, who in 1983 announced the unprecedented policy that the Santa Ana police force would not cooperate with the Immigration and Naturalization Service in their raids and roundups of undocumented immigrants.<sup>22</sup>

### THE NEIGHBORHOODS ORGANIZE

Latino residents acted to organize urban life in Santa Ana but until the mid-1970s did so outside the political arena. Latinos began to mobilize in force when city planning threatened the existence of their homes and neighborhoods, a process dating from 1976, with the implementation of the first phase of redevelopment. Early redevelopment had three objectives that required the demolition of a number of central-city neighborhoods. The primary objective was to "revitalize" the downtown and expand the civic-center complex. City council members and planners envisioned a downtown oriented toward persons working in government, finance, and professional activities. The second objective was to sustain economic growth by building high-density apartments and condominiums for middle-income residents. A third planning objective, to eradicate "incompatible land uses" or the coexistence of homes and industry, also threatened older barrios. Toward these ends, planning documents invariably cited substandard housing in the barrios and city center, and recommended the demolition of homes and apartment units or else strict code enforcement to eradicate what planners defined as blight.

The Orange County Sponsoring Committee, formed by twenty Latino community activists, brought a group of professional organizers to Santa Ana to establish a stable grass-roots organization that could respond to the threats posed to the neighborhoods by redevelopment. The committee secured a two-year budget from the Catholic Church, local businesses, and other churches, and contracted with Jesuit organizers from the Oakland Training Institute.<sup>23</sup> Three Jesuit priests and four young-adult lay organizers constituted the team, which began organizing in the fall of 1976. Using the Alinsky model of community organizing, they aimed at empowering the working poor by training them in confrontational politics at the municipal level. The organizers proceeded by canvassing neighborhoods to discover the issues most troubling to their residents, to locate potential leaders, and, in particular areas, to spread news about the city's plans. Through this process they established the foundations for neighborhood associations, the basic units for grass-roots participation in the urban movement between 1977 and 1982. These associations were the core of the pluralistic model of urban politics envisioned by Saul Alinsky; they promoted local autonomy and widespread citizen participa-

tion and thereby fostered the democratization of municipal politics.<sup>24</sup> The organizers considered the issue-oriented agendas of the neighborhood associations tactical, a means through which small victories would bring members into the association and promote the growth of militancy.

During the early months the organizers began systematically to train neighborhood residents in community organizing. Jenny Casamina described her first meeting with organizer Meg Gaff. Gaff knocked at her door and asked, "Do you speak English? Do you know the city is going to knock these places down and get rid of you guys?" Casamina answered, "They didn't notify me. . . . They're crazy if they think I'm going to move." That evening she went to a meeting with other soon-to-be leaders from diverse barrios, the priests, and lay organizers. These training sessions were long and difficult. Numerous neighborhood leaders recall tears and agony as the organizers prepared them to confront the hostility and the race and class prejudices of city officials. Out of the process, however, Casamina argues that the priests taught them "to fight for our rights without hurting others." Everyone learned "discipline, solidarity and cooperation," lessons that remained a foundation for a grass-roots politics through 1987.<sup>25</sup> Grass-roots leaders were placed in important positions as neighborhood organizers, and by May 1977 eight neighborhood associations joined together to form Santa Ana Neighborhood Organizations (SANO).

SANO was a highly democratic organization whose leadership included women and members of ethnic groups in virtually exact proportion to the distribution of these ethnic groups in each neighborhood. This democratic structure was embedded in the organization's neighborhood base and drew on neighborhood networks to recruit members and sustain major battles with the city over urban issues. Women, the center of these networks, constituted a majority of SANO's neighborhood organizers and spokespersons.<sup>26</sup> SANO's leadership, argued a former president, was representative of "truly grassroots people, the people that never set foot in city hall, the people that never knew they could be potential leaders." Some of the top leaders were "your everyday farmworker. . . . I myself am a cabinet maker, for instance, and the vice-president is a beautician."<sup>27</sup> Although ethnic tensions caused many other community organizations to decline in membership, SANO was successful in bringing ethnic groups together because it promoted ethnic consciousness. Well over half the membership and a corresponding proportion of the leadership was Latino, but black, Anglo, and a few Asian residents also played an important role in building the neighborhood associations. SANO was also successful in building a multiethnic, democratic structure because it developed a culture of protest. Celebrations and festive fundraisers were an important part of the organization's agenda. The street demonstrations, rallies, candlelight vigils, and actions at City Hall often drew on popular religious

and cultural activities and infused these with a new political consciousness. At its height in 1982 SANO had a membership of approximately ten thousand households and thirteen neighborhood associations. Each neighborhood organization formulated wide-ranging demands such as paving streets, replacing sidewalks, improving parks, monitoring neighborhood industry for safety standards, improving street lighting, and eradicating cockroaches. SANO monitored the city's Community Economic Development Block Grant budget (federal funds for urban improvement) and requested those funds after having determined collectively how to pool them to meet each neighborhood's needs. SANO also formed a housing committee that monitored city housing programs and a crime committee that monitored police activity and mediated between residents and the police in cases involving conflict. An education and health committee took up a series of issues that affected SANO neighborhoods and the city's working poor.

#### THE TACTICS AND SCOPE OF PROTEST: THREE CASES

SANO's agenda, organized around the neighborhood so as to make municipal government responsible to its citizens, did not change the city's political structure or alter the goals of urban policy. Nonetheless, it did produce major victories that affected all SANO's thirteen neighborhoods and promoted the development of a new political life and consciousness. Only months after the first neighborhood associations had formed, their presentations before the city council were, in the words of one council member, "as neat and well-organized as anything I've seen come before the council. They click off five or six or seven points, . . . and they are finished in maybe twenty minutes." The city manager lamented the effectiveness of these tactics, arguing that the activists "egg others into similar actions by taking pictures at the council meetings that later appear in Spanish newspapers indicating what organizing can achieve."<sup>28</sup> By late April 1977 neighborhoods had begun inviting city council members and the planning staff to their community meetings, thus turning around the power relationships embedded in territorial control and encouraging ever larger numbers of community residents to act. Three neighborhood associations conducted fairly prolonged battles with the city beginning in early 1977. Consideration of them shows the nature and scope of urban struggle during these years.

In the Civic Center Barrio, formed as a Latino neighborhood between 1945 and the mid-1960s, four hundred families were forcibly removed when the barrio was demolished in 1977 for middle-income and senior-citizen apartments and condominiums on the downtown's west side. They remained organized after their displacement and formed a community

housing corporation by 1980. The neighborhood, in its early stages of organizing when the evictions began, first negotiated with the city in late November 1976 to secure relocation allowances for displaced residents. In early January over two hundred neighbors, including the elderly and parents with young children, attended a city council meeting. The neighborhood's well-coordinated agenda was translated, and neighbors, such as an elderly tailor, spoke in Spanish before the council, making known the hardships residents experienced when evicted. Their appearance was dramatic, an unprecedented intervention by long-established Latino residents and recent immigrants into the political life of the city. Emphasizing the degree to which this early organizing had increased the residents' expectations of government, one council member complained, "The people began to perceive this as the way . . . the city ought to be, [but it goes] far beyond what is technically required in the relocation process."<sup>29</sup>

Many of their proposals for relocation were accepted by the city, and in March 1977 the neighborhood association negotiated an agreement with the Redevelopment Agency and the developer to secure 58 of the 318 planned rental units for displaced renters; but in 1979 the developer changed the rental units into condominiums, with city approval.<sup>30</sup> A battle ensued during the course of which the neighborhood formed the Civic Center Barrio Housing Corporation (CCBHC), entitled to produce, own, operate, and manage housing. The corporation's board of directors was made up of former barrio residents and professionals in housing, government, and banking. The residents retained a slight majority. Thus, the barrio association, with its residents dispersed throughout the city and county, not only remained alive but also had reconstituted itself as a corporate entity responsible for the multiple tasks of producing and managing housing. In 1981 the association entered litigation to recover the amount still owed by the developer from the May 1980 settlement of \$1.4 million to build low- and moderate-income housing in Santa Ana.

Although the participation of the original barrio residents gradually declined, 150 of those residents joined for a victory party to celebrate the establishment of the corporation in 1980, and many continued to envision the reconstitution of the community in a single neighborhood. Juvenal Capistrano echoed these intentions: "Since the moment we left the barrio my dream has always been to come back."<sup>31</sup> Those who remained active in the neighborhood battle were represented in the administration of a \$1.5 million housing budget, and the board of directors continued to be composed of the most active grass-roots leaders. Between 1982 and 1987 the CCBHC became the owner of an increasing number of rental units organized along the principles of cooperation that residents learned during the neighborhood struggle. An elected committee organized the maintenance of the buildings and enforced agreed-upon rules, and neigh-

bors cooperated in watching the children, aiding in crises, and organizing parties and other events. The CCBHC also directed the construction of owner-built homes cooperatively organized along the principles developed in the neighborhood battles.

Logan Barrio's fight to halt its destruction presents a different case of urban protest. In 1976 city planners recommended that Logan Barrio be brought into the redevelopment project as the first phase of a project to construct a modern industrial park near the downtown.<sup>32</sup> Logan was zoned industrial in 1929, but the small firms that had located in the barrio since 1945 coexisted well with the barrio's approximately 507 residents. Because a substantial number of the firms also faced removal, they joined in a coalition with the residents between 1977 and 1979 to fight the barrio's incorporation into the redevelopment zone and to rezone it from industrial to residential usage with appropriate guarantees to protect existing industry.<sup>33</sup>

The tactics used in the Logan struggle were some of the most innovative in Santa Ana. For the first time, a Latino neighborhood defined itself to the public and press, making its history and the organization of community life the grounds on which the neighborhood should be saved. As Josefa Andrade argued to the press and city government: "People like me were born and raised here, and raised our own kids here, and some of their kids." Helen Moraga pointed out that her family had lived in Logan for five generations: "It's still the kind of neighborhood where people watch out for one another's children and elderly parents."<sup>34</sup> Residents had lived in the barrio an average of twenty-three years; in 1979 fully one-quarter of the population had lived there for forty years or more. Thirty percent of the dwellings were owner-occupied. In many instances these people owned one or more additional homes on their own lot or next door, which they rented out, bringing the owners who lived in the area to 50 percent. Often these properties were rented to family relations. Fifty-four percent of Logan residents had relatives living in another home within the barrio.<sup>35</sup>

These close networks of family and friends had sustained urban protest in the early 1970s, when city plans to extend Civic Center Drive East through the neighborhood were successfully defeated and the thoroughfare was rerouted.<sup>36</sup> They were again successful after a two-year battle in City Hall. In 1979 the neighborhood was rezoned for residential use through a specially designed (R2x) zoning ordinance that allowed industry to coexist with or to replace or be replaced by housing. Logan residents continue to be organized as a neighborhood and have avoided further demolition.<sup>37</sup> Like many other neighborhoods, they are now formally incorporated into a city neighborhood program.

The barrio of Artesia-Pilar, which defended its opposition to the de-

struction of forty dwellings to make way for a new police station on the grounds that the poor had a right to their homes and community, presents a third case of a successful neighborhood association's battle against urban renewal in the late 1970s. The tactics used by the neighborhood also demonstrate the importance of a shared political culture of protest. When informed of the city plans, the residents organized as a SANO neighborhood and met in homes, patios, and the local Catholic Church to organize against removal. The police station was never built, and the city promised to spend more than \$200,000 to rehabilitate or rebuild 110 homes in the barrio. Ninety were supposed to be done by 1980, but work had not begun on even one when a second protest erupted. The city was considering incorporating the neighborhood into its redevelopment area. The city gave a consortium of three developers the right to negotiate for a redevelopment project to extend middle-class housing near the civic-center condominium project. Residents again responded, with protest made into a festive act; neighborhood residents, young and old, drew a huge line in red crepe paper over a large number of city blocks to symbolically mark the limits of redevelopment.<sup>38</sup> These events took place with high-profile news coverage. After SANO's demise (which we discuss later in this chapter) and as late as 1986, Jovita Hernandez, the principal spokeswoman for the Artesia-Pilar neighborhood, noted the existence of a network whereby neighbors kept each other abreast of city plans.<sup>39</sup>

In all three cases, these urban struggles produced grass-roots leaders and formal and informal neighborhood organizations that continued to influence the political life of the city even after a decline in SANO's activity and influence beginning in 1983. SANO declined because it lost most of its professional staff. The Jesuits departed from Santa Ana in 1983, leaving only two paid organizers as full-time staff. Neighborhood leaders, already burdened by long working days and family responsibilities, could not undertake the consuming work of organizing a multifaceted protest without sufficient personnel. Simultaneously, the umbrella organization that trained SANO's leaders and sponsored its staff shifted its organizing strategy to church-based community action and withdrew its support for neighborhood-based groups. By the spring of 1984 few neighborhood associations met. One year later the General Board of Directors merged SANO with a countywide, church-based group. Some of the SANO neighborhoods have retained their identity, but they work separately with the city's much expanded planning department.

#### TENANTS' STRIKE

Grass-roots organizing again gained momentum in 1984, when Santa Ana launched the most aggressive code-enforcement policy in California.



Tenants whose landlords refused to bring their buildings up to code were evicted. Code enforcement was a strategy, previously used sparingly, through which the city attempted to gain some control over demographic change by forcing tenants from their homes and pressuring landlords to upgrade housing to attract a higher-income and, presumably, largely Anglo population. Neighborhoods near the central city were the target areas for code enforcement. Unlike previous city planning policies, this one was focused on neighborhoods that had rapidly become Latino after 1970. Hence, it affected primarily the undocumented immigrant population and did not encroach on long-established barrios. This produced a major shift in the strategy of urban struggle, and for the first time the primarily undocumented immigrant population took the lead. The strike activity of tenants was a sharp departure from the neighborhood-based protest of SANO, and it publicized the rights of undocumented immigrants to adequate housing. The strikes eventually formed part of a larger political mobilization that worked against redevelopment and for reforming the structure of city government and the planning commission.

In 1984, during the early implementation of code enforcement, tenants mobilized to protest the eviction notices they received. Although the city ordered the evictions, the city council voted three times against making relocation funds available to displaced tenants. A coalition of civic and religious groups was formed to organize and represent the tenants; it pressed the city council to make available ample relocation benefits and to establish a moratorium on evictions.<sup>40</sup> After hundreds of undocumented immigrants organized, the city finally approved a tenant relocation program.<sup>41</sup> Relocation was not the answer to the problems of substandard housing and displacement. Because the enforcement policies focused on eight of the ten most impoverished census tracts in the county, evicted tenants could not find affordable replacement housing in the city or county. In fact, six months after the establishment of the relocation program, only ten families, out of hundreds evicted, had been assisted in finding new homes.<sup>42</sup> The dearth of housing, the relatively large size of families, and the fact that many tenants were well established in their neighborhoods made many unwilling and unable to move.

The rent strike that began in January 1985 grew out of this resistance to relocation and constituted the second phase of the tenants' movement. *Hermanidad Mexicana Nacional*, an immigrants' rights group that established a chapter in Santa Ana in the early 1980s, coordinated the strike activity and took the lead in subsequent litigation and organizing. *Hermanidad's* strategy was influenced by three models: the Alinsky model of community organizing, labor organizing, and the Mexican mutual-aid societies of the Southwest and Mexico.<sup>43</sup> The influence of labor organizing and mutual-aid societies made *Hermanidad's* objectives and organiza-

tional form distinct from those of SANO. The organization addressed a larger range of issues, such as the legal status and employment conditions of immigrants. While SANO's emphasis was on building autonomous neighborhood associations for participation in municipal politics, *Hermanidad's* concern was to eradicate the general conditions of exploitation experienced by the immigrant. Its goal was to build organizations at the workplace as well as in the community. The rent strike and extensive court litigation that characterized the tenants' movement further distinguish this urban movement from the neighborhood-based struggle.

*Hermanidad* grew from a small group of approximately ten families in 1982 to encompass close to three thousand families by 1987. A budding grass-roots leadership emerged from the strikes, and a second influx of members became active by 1987, often drawn into the organization by *Hermanidad's* work in processing immigration papers. Some of the grass-roots leaders had been activists in land and labor struggles in Mexico and the United States, but many had gained their experience in the course of the urban struggle in Santa Ana. As in SANO, community women were some of the most militant and outspoken strike leaders. Maria Rosa Ibarra, instrumental in forming *Hermanidad* in Santa Ana, consciously built on the female consciousness that has encouraged women to act when housing and subsistence are the issues, and sought to promote the development of this feminist consciousness and female leadership in the organization.<sup>44</sup>

Many of the Catholic churches in Santa Ana supported the rent strike. By 1987 organizers were able to go to any parish in Santa Ana to make announcements during the mass, pass out literature, and collect letters of support outside the church door. The strong familial and kinship networks among immigrants sustained *Hermanidad's* growth by bringing an ever larger number of people into the strike.

On New Year's Day, 1985, twenty families on Minnie Street vowed to withhold their rent; in early February the strike spread to seventy-five other families.<sup>45</sup> The strikers were subject to eviction if their dwellings were not brought up to code and for failure to pay their rent; hence litigation was essential to the success of the strike. In February tenants began proceedings to obtain court protection against harassment and eviction. By late February they won a court-approved plan to make the Orange County Legal Aid Society the temporary landlord for nearly four hundred apartments. The judge also placed a restraining order on seven landlords, restricting them from harassing their tenants by cutting off utilities or by calling the Immigration and Naturalization Service.

This protection allowed the tenants to take the offensive in defining the code-enforcement program; they immediately began to stage public demonstrations to protest their living conditions and to demand city inspec-

tion of units they declared unfit for habitation. More than three hundred tenants appeared before the city council after having waited many months for the inspection of their dwellings.<sup>46</sup> By April 1985 the renters began to seek court orders to reduce the rents on their dwellings until repairs were made. In 1985 and 1986 tenants sustained and joined the strike and were active in street processions and demonstrations, while court victories and out-of-court settlements favoring tenants encouraged an ever-increasing number of renters in substandard dwellings to strike, independent of the direct pressure exerted through code-enforcement evictions.<sup>47</sup> The number of persons involved fluctuated; for example, when families from 130 units joined the strike in June 1987, they joined others who had already been on strike for more than eighteen months.

Why did tenants strike? One tenant leader echoed the vast majority of women leaders when she argued, "For the good of ourselves and our children; because it's very ugly there."<sup>48</sup> In court proceedings tenants testified that they went on strike because their ceilings were falling, walls were caving in or had large holes, plumbing leaked, the windows were unsafe, cockroaches and rats infested their buildings. They argued that their low incomes, large families, and well-established neighborhood life made it impossible to find sufficient replacement housing.<sup>49</sup> One tenant faced with eviction from a large unit argued: "We are poor families that cannot move."<sup>50</sup> In other complexes the unfair practices of the landlords were enough to bring people into the strike.<sup>51</sup>

The city council initially established the code-enforcement program so that it was grossly unfavorable to the tenants. Owners who violated codes were fined a \$150 administrative fee when the city issued a notice of violation for renting out an unsafe dwelling; tenants who refused to vacate an unsafe housing unit, however, faced fines up to \$500 per day. The Rental Relocation Fund established by the city council in December 1984 represented a compromise with the tenants and housing activists, and increased slightly the burden of responsibility on the landlords. The pressure tenants had exerted on the city by that date also resulted in city lawsuits against particular landlords for their failure to comply with codes. But the city refused to place a moratorium on evictions, and in the first year of the program an estimated 1,240 to 3,000 persons were evicted. After three years of the program, hundreds of people had faced multiple displacements as they moved from residence to residence within Santa Ana's pockets of poverty. The city government stepped up pressure against tenants in 1986.

This new offensive developed when the city council voted to interpret the Uniform Housing Code conservatively and established an overcrowding ordinance that drastically reduced the number of people who could legally inhabit a home.<sup>52</sup> Overcrowding citations brought a new wave of

eviction notices. Not accidentally, and because of the pressure exerted by landlords, the bulk of these notices went to three hundred of the four hundred units successfully defended in court. Units with the same or a similar number of inhabitants that had not either won their cases or taken the landlords to court did not receive the notices.<sup>53</sup> Despite over ten thousand letters of protest the city council upheld its interpretation of the occupancy code. *Overcrowding* became a major political issue and a code word for expressing anti-immigrant and anti-Mexican sentiment in city council meetings and during municipal elections.

#### A BROAD COALITION AND POLITICAL REACTION

In July 1985 fifteen hundred rent strikers and other Latinos met at Madison Park in Santa Ana for a celebration dinner and fundraiser; the event was sponsored by tenants and housing advocates, and included a host of speakers from organizations long involved in the nearly decade-old urban movement. At this celebration the tenants announced their decision to join the coalition of forces against redevelopment.<sup>54</sup> They made this decision in a crucial moment, when the protest against redevelopment was firmly fixed on the question of affordable housing. Between 1982 and 1985 housing advocates sought to extend the amount of tax-increment funds to be used for low- and moderate-income housing beyond the state-mandated 20 percent. In 1984 housing advocates won an out-of-court settlement of lawsuits filed immediately after the new redevelopment plans were announced in 1982; in this settlement the city committed 30 percent of the revenue from two new redevelopment project areas and 60 percent from a third for such housing.<sup>55</sup> However, in the wake of this settlement, the city began to accelerate its downtown redevelopment project and announced the strict code-enforcement program discussed previously. As in all redevelopment projects, the city subsidized the acquisition and improvement of downtown sites for private developers. For example, the city's total costs to acquire and prepare the land for a condominium project amounted to \$3.45 million; the developer bought the property from the city for only \$250,000. The Alliance for Fair Redevelopment formed to block a hotel/office complex and an apartment project downtown, arguing that the city should develop affordable rental units for the low-income families displaced through code enforcement.<sup>56</sup>

As housing activists mobilized to demand an increased share of redevelopment funds and housing for tenants and other working-class residents, downtown Latino merchants began to fight their removal in a separate battle. City planners considered most of the Latino merchants economically and socially marginal to the new downtown. As the director

of the Downtown Development Commission stated, "New businesses, which cater to tourists, young urban professionals, and the upper-middle class will take the place of many existing Latino businesses."<sup>57</sup> The deputy city manager also argued that new residential construction would appeal to "yuppies . . . who will make downtown exciting, who will bring all kinds of demands to the area."<sup>58</sup> In 1984 the city stepped up its enforcement of building codes downtown and, in a contradictory move that would bring the destruction of those same buildings, sent out offers to two hundred corporate developers to buy and restructure the area as a shopping and entertainment center. As a result José Ceballos, who owned three buildings on East Fourth Street, had to bring them up to the city's seismic code at great cost, but in the projected plans for "revitalization" Ceballos's buildings faced probable demolition within two years.<sup>59</sup> In late June 1984 the downtown Latino merchants put forth their own plans for the 4.31-acre site in partnership with a local development firm. These merchants organized at a time when other Latino businesses were forming the Hispanic Chamber of Commerce in Santa Ana and when middle-class Latino residents were beginning to take an active role in municipal politics.

In December 1985 a new political coalition joined together previous SANO members, Hermandad, the Alliance for Fair Redevelopment, and middle-class neighborhood organizations.<sup>60</sup> The Santa Ana Merged Society of Neighbors (SAMSON) wanted to replace the partial ward system, in which voters elected all city council members including those from within and outside their ward, with a direct ward vote for that district's city council representative. (See Olin's discussion of SAMSON in Chapter 8.) The coalition also sought to replace the appointed planning commission with elected commissioners and to replace the appointed city manager with an elected, executive mayor.<sup>61</sup> The city council refused to put these proposed city-charter amendments on a special June 1986 election ballot. In response, SAMSON organized a voter-registration drive and collected enough signatures to place the initiative on the ballot. They succeeded, but Measure C, which proposed the creation of an executive mayor's position and a ward vote for city council members, lost by a narrow margin. SAMSON members claim that a series of mailers sent by the anonymous Good Government Committee distorted the measure, were deceptive and misleading, and led to its defeat. "Prior to the 'hit pieces,'" the SAMSON chairman argued, "the polls indicated a 2 to 1 support for Measure C." Absentee ballots (reflecting decisions made prior to the mailing) gave Measure C a 2-to-1 edge.<sup>62</sup>

The attacks on Measure C were directed against the tenants' movement and Latino immigrants, and generally argued that a conspiratorial group in the city had introduced the initiative to do away with code-enforcement

policies. One mailer argued, "If they win, their first action will be to strike down code enforcement laws." A second argued that Measure C's proponents "would use their City Hall takeover to strike down code enforcement and open our neighborhoods up to rundown, overcrowded boarding houses."<sup>63</sup> SAMSON's membership was not composed primarily of Latinos, and yet its initiative was contested wholly on the basis of attacks against the organized Latino population, suggesting that the grass-roots Latino activists were the most effective target to use to mobilize the predominantly Anglo, middle-class voting public (fully 77 percent of the registered voters in Santa Ana).<sup>64</sup> SAMSON placed a similar measure on the November 1986 ballot. Misleading anti-immigrant and antitenant brochures, now written by the anonymous Santa Ana Neighbors for Excellence, argued that proponents of the measure wanted to make Santa Ana into a slum. After the failed election, Latino grass-roots activists and lawyers began to plan for a major voter-registration drive among Latinos and for new challenges to the municipal government's policies on urban development and political representation.

#### CONCLUSION

The history of grass-roots protest illustrates the political process that began as Latinos became a majority of Santa Ana's population. This protest has a strong civil rights focus and, as elsewhere, has brought the struggle for civil rights into the sphere of municipal politics by addressing the economic and political implications of urban development for the city's Latino working class. Although race is not a singular indicator of social-class standing in postsuburban society, a majority of Latinos in Orange County remain residentially concentrated and poorer than the Anglo majority; in 1977 fully 88 percent of Latinos in the county earned below the median income. The politicization of this population during the decade-long struggle considered in this chapter remains one of the most important long-term consequences of urban protest in Santa Ana.

The political mobilization of Santa Ana's Latino residents was furthered by the tangible results of grass-roots action. Neighborhoods were saved from destruction and funds were secured for neighborhood improvements determined by the residents. A grass-roots housing corporation was successfully established. In its units and cooperative housing projects, as in other neighborhoods, residents have maintained informal structures through which they make democratic decisions regarding neighborhood life and check the actions of city government. Another important legacy of the once-powerful neighborhood associations is the political consciousness and continued activism of a significant sector of the city's long-established Latino population. After 1982, redevelopment efforts shifted

to focus on previously unbuilt land adjacent to the freeways, and suits brought against the redevelopment plan to secure an increased portion of redevelopment tax-increment funds for low- and moderate-income housing initiated an era when urban conflicts were frequently taken to court. During this period immigrant tenants organized to fight their displacement from eight of the county's ten poorest census tracts. The rent strike secured increased protection of tenants' rights and improvements in many of their living conditions. Downtown Latino merchants organized at the same time as the strike and increased their representation in the city's commercial, urban, and political affairs. The urban movement gained full force in the coalition formed to restructure municipal government in 1985. Although the coalition's goals were not attained, its defeat at the polls was followed by a voter-registration drive among Latinos that promises to produce a new majority in future elections.

The logic of Santa Ana's urban planning was described by Mayor Daniel Griscti, who declared in 1986, "This city council is not advancing the politics of poverty. . . . Our politics are the politics of progress."<sup>65</sup> The meaning of progress was widely debated between 1976 and 1986. The grass-roots movement fought for a vision of progress that included the right to maintain well-established neighborhoods, to secure a substantial quantity of standard low-rent housing, and to build a quality neighborhood and urban life for the majority of the city's residents. The attempt to reform local government and the planning process, which became a focus of the movement after 1985, directly challenged the power of the county's new corporate elite to define alone the nature of urban change. By that date the fiscal importance and bureaucratic strength of the redevelopment agency had committed the city to continued urban reorganization, and the ballot had become pivotal to influence the direction of this process. At the conclusion of a decade of urban protest the political innovation introduced by the previously most marginal sectors of the city's population remains salient; this arm of grass-roots protest remains essential to bring about a fundamental democratization of municipal government.

#### NOTES

1. For a discussion of urban movements and historical case studies of urban struggles, see Manuel Castells, *The City and the Grassroots: A Cross-Cultural Theory of Urban Social Movements* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983).

2. According to City Manager Carl Thornton (1951-73) the city was in serious jeopardy of losing its county administrative functions to the rapidly developing cities elsewhere in the county. The city and private citizens donated "a lot of property outright, free of charge" so the civic-center complex could be con-

structed. *Los Angeles Times*, 21 Sept. 1975, XI:12. Nancy Kleniewski notes that when cities did not have resources (such as the administrative complex) to facilitate a shift to a corporate (as opposed to an industrial) city, their urban-renewal projects failed. "From Industrial to Corporate City: The Role of Urban Renewal," in *Marxism and the Metropolis*, ed. William Tabb and Larry Sawers (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), 212.

3. Antonio Delgado, "An Analysis of Hispanic Youth in Santa Ana: Recommended Public Policy Direction," May 1986 (report available at City Manager's Office). (Fifty percent of these Latino residents were foreign-born; 91 percent were of Mexican ancestry.)

4. For a discussion of the history of federal urban-renewal and redevelopment policy, see John Mollenkopf, *The Contested City* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1983).

5. Consistent with the history of federal urban policy, Santa Ana's redevelopment and planning projects were not intended primarily to benefit the city's predominantly working-class population, although housing advocates since the 1930s have attempted to shape a federal policy that is favorable to the urban poor. For a concise history of this problem, see Marc Weiss, "The Origins and Legacy of Urban Renewal," in *Urban and Regional Planning in an Age of Austerity*, ed. Pierre Clavel, John Forester, and William Goldsmith (New York: Pergamon Press, 1980), 53-80.

6. For studies concerning the political economy of urban change and the course of urban protest elsewhere, see Clarence Stone and Heywood Sanders, eds., *The Politics of Urban Development* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1987); Susan Fainstein et al., eds., *Restructuring the City* (New York: Longman, 1983); and Sidney Plotkin, "Democratic Change in the Urban Political Economy," in *The Politics of San Antonio*, ed. David Johnson et al. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1983).

7. Interview by author with Rob Balen, former senior planner for the City of Santa Ana, 2 Oct. 1987.

8. Interview by author with Gordon Bricken, former Santa Ana mayor, 5 Oct. 1987.

9. Denise Arend, from the California Department of Housing and Community Development, argued that "vocal activists do more to ensure agencies comply with the law than the state housing agency." *Orange County Register*, 11 Sept. 1985, B6.

10. See Allen Scott, "High Technology Industry and Territorial Development: The Rise of the Orange County Complex, 1955-1984," *Urban Geography* 7 (January-February 1986): 3-45, and Alfred Serrato, "The State of Hispanics in Orange County—1980," 1981 (report available at County Administrative Building Library). Serrato argues that Latinos also constitute a significant segment of the construction work force in the county, which rose from 15,900 workers in 1958 to 62,500 in 1980, while manufacturing workers increased from 85,000 to 164,500 between 1970 and 1980.

11. City of Santa Ana, *Santa Ana Special Census* (available at Santa Ana City Library).



12. Serrato, "The State of Hispanics," 15.
13. For a discussion of the early formation of the barrios in Southern California, see Albert Camarillo, *Chicanos in a Changing Society* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1979); Ricardo Romo, *East Los Angeles* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982); and Richard Griswold del Castillo, *The Los Angeles Barrio* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979).
14. Santa Ana Unified School District, *Ethnic Distribution by Percentages* (Santa Ana, Calif., 15 Oct. 1970). The schools and percentages of Spanish-surname students were: Edison 75 percent, Franklin 69 percent, Fremont 72 percent, Lowell 64 percent, McKinley 83 percent, Monroe 90 percent, Muir 65 percent, and Roosevelt 70 percent.
15. Santa Ana Unified School District, *Racial and Ethnic Characteristics* (Santa Ana, Calif., October 1975 and October 1986). A 1982 map divided Santa Ana into sixteen barrios that covered the whole of the city south of Seventeenth Street. This map hung on the wall of the office of the Santa Ana police department's Barrio Program, directed by Theresa Bradley.
16. According to the 1980 census, the comparative figures are: Placentia 20.3 percent, Stanton 21.4 percent, La Habra 22.2 percent, Orange 12.4 percent, Anaheim 17.1 percent, and 11 percent in San Juan Capistrano. (Santa Ana, 44.5 percent.)
17. See, for example, the study by Richard Mines on the nature of these migration networks. *Developing a Community Tradition of Migration to the U.S. Monograph #3*. La Jolla: Program in U.S.-Mexican Studies, University of California at San Diego, 1981.
18. Ina Rosenthal-Urey, "Church Records as a Source of Data on Mexican Migrant Workers: A Methodological Note," unpublished manuscript, ca. 1983, 13-15 (in possession of author).
19. An increasing number of single women and female heads of households have characterized the immigrant stream since the late 1960s. For an informative study on the relationship between border industrialization, female labor-force participation, and the increase in female immigration to the United States, see María Patricia Fernández-Kelly, *For We Are Sold, I and My People: Women and Industry in Mexico's Frontier* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1983).
20. Interview by author with Pedro Vasquez, August 12, 1987. He and other vendors (who work largely in Anaheim's Latino community) formed the Unión de Comerciantes Latinos del Sur de California in 1975. They changed their name to the Southern California Latino's Small Business Association in 1986. They formed the organization because of city and police harassment against them in Anaheim. Vasquez noted that Santa Ana was, to date, a refuge from harassment for vendors.
21. *Miniondas* began as a bilingual paper in 1975 and since 1980 has been published in Spanish only. *Semanario Azteca* was founded in 1980 and provides excellent professional coverage of local and Latin American news. A number of small Spanish-language papers have come and gone since the late 1970s.
22. Jerome Skolnick and David Bayley, *The New Blue Line: Police Innovation in Six American Cities* (London: Collier Macmillan, 1987), 35. The Legal Aid Society

- of Orange County has brought a number of class-action suits to stop raids and the harassment of individuals by the Immigration and Naturalization Service in Santa Ana and elsewhere in Southern California since 1979. They have won restraining orders against the agency that have kept it off the street for varying lengths of time.
23. The Institute was established in 1972 by two Jesuit priests who had been trained in organizing at the Alinsky Industrial Areas Foundation in Chicago.
24. See Saul Alinsky, *Rules for Radicals* (New York: Random House, 1969); also see Castells, *The City and the Grassroots*, 61. Castells argues that the Alinsky model represented the major cultural heritage of the neighborhood-based protest of the 1960s.
25. Interview with Jenny Casamina by author, 7 Aug. 1987.
26. See, for example, *Neighborhood News*, 10 Sept. 1980.
27. Interview with Sam Romero by author, 8 June 1982.
28. *Los Angeles Times*, 3 Apr. 1977, X:7-8.
29. Santa Ana City Council minutes, 7 Feb. 1977.
30. Santa Ana City Council minutes, 29 Mar. 1977. The Redevelopment Agency entered these negotiations with the barrio association and its Western Center on Law and Poverty and the Legal Aid Society of Orange County. The agreement also stipulated the conditions under which a handful of former residents could buy or rent rehabilitated homes moved from the project site, and it established a fund to help provide rent-subsidized housing for low-income residents who would not move into the fifty-eight units. All residents who applied for relocation allowances received those funds for a four-year period, longer than the state mandated, as a result of the neighborhood's politicization.
31. Quoted in *El Quetzal*, 4 (May 1980), 1.
32. Santa Ana Planning Department, *Central Santa Ana: Community Plan—Final Report* (Santa Ana, Calif., 1977), 2-3. Approximately half the city's 3,080 acres in industrially zoned land was vacant at the time the plans were devised.
33. Businesses backed out of the coalition in early 1979 and hired their own lawyer to represent them to the city. They feared that residential zoning would threaten their property values and chances for future expansion. The zoning ordinance finally passed by the city was a compromise between businesses and residents.
34. *Los Angeles Times*, 26 June 1977, X:2, and 3 April 1977, X:9.
35. Advanced Planning and Research Associates, *Environmental Impact Report: Logan Neighborhood* (Santa Ana, Calif., January 1979), 31-32, 58-60.
36. *Orange County Register*, 16 Dec. 1970, F6.
37. In 1986 Logan residents won rezoning as R2, new residential construction only.
38. *Orange County Register*, 11 Dec. 1980, B1.
39. Interview by author with Jovita Hernandez, 22 July 1986.
40. The coalition included the League of Latin American Citizens, SANO, public housing and social agencies, the Legal Aid Society, various church and union organizations, and Hermandad Mexicana Nacional. In July 1984 the coalition took the name Concerned Citizens of Santa Ana and began, with Herman-

dad, to organize families directly affected by code-enforcement programs. On November 25 it adopted the name David Coalition for Housing.

41. *Los Angeles Times*, 11 Dec. 1984, 1.

42. LeDale Dunbar, then head of the Feedback Foundation, which administered the relocation funds, reported in the *Orange County Register* on June 1985 that of the one hundred eligible families who had applied for housing, more than 75 percent were working for the minimum wage, with average gross incomes of about ninety-six hundred dollars a year.

43. Interview by author with Nativo Lopez, director of Hermandad Mexicana Nacional, in Santa Ana, 6 Aug. 1987.

44. Interview by author with Maria Rosa Ibarra, 15 Aug. 1987.

45. Minnie Street is an immigrant neighborhood approximately one-quarter of a mile long. The one- and two-bedroom units house from six to sixteen people.

46. *Orange County Register*, 21 May 1985.

47. In 1985 alone thirty jury trials were held on an apartment-complex basis. Interview by author with Richard Spix, attorney for Hermandad Mexicana Nacional, 29 July 1987.

48. Interview by author with tenant-strike leader, 15 Aug. 1987.

49. Superior Court of the State of California, County of Orange. Mario Gonzalez et al. v. Carmine Esposito et al. Case 451577.

50. Interview by author with tenant-strike leader and inspection of a unit on strike, 15 Aug. 1987.

51. Interview by author with tenant-strike leaders, 12 Aug. 1987.

52. The Uniform Housing Code mandates seventy square feet of sleeping area for the first two occupants of a dwelling and an additional fifty square feet for each additional occupant. Unlike other California cities and counties that included the dining room and living room in their calculation of sleeping space, allowing a family of five to inhabit a one-bedroom unit, Santa Ana included only bedrooms when calculating sleeping space.

53. Interview by author with Spix, 29 Aug. 1987.

54. *Orange County Register*, 6 Sept. 1985, and 8 Sept. 1985.

55. *Los Angeles Times*, 24 Sept. 1984, local section, 1, 5-6, and *Santa Ana Business Journal*, Mar. 1984, 1, 7. In addition, the city agreed to find a new site for a number of businesses before displacing them; it promised no retaliation against the property of those who filed suit and agreed not to use its power of eminent domain over other businesses and homes until 1989.

56. *Orange County Register*, 22 July 1985, B1.

57. *Orange County Register*, 5 Sept. 1984, 5.

58. *Los Angeles Times*, 24 Sept. 1984, local section, 5.

59. *Orange County Register*, 24 July 1984.

60. These middle-class organizations consisted of a group of north Santa Ana residents (primarily Anglo American) that had joined together to oppose the diversion of traffic through their street; a second group formed to oppose the establishment of a domed basketball stadium at the location of the Santa Ana Stadium; and a third established to fight the construction of a replacement football stadium in their neighborhood.

61. SANO had long criticized Santa Ana's partial ward system. In 1977 Sadie Reed, a black candidate from Ward 5, lost the election and took her case to court, arguing that the system effectively disenfranchised the city's black and Chicano residents. SANO backed her case, but she lost.

62. Letter to Parker Kennedy, chairman, Santa Ana Chamber of Commerce, from Jim Lowman, chairman, SAMSON, dated 5 June 1986.

63. Four mailers sent by the Santa Ana Good Government Committee.

64. *Orange County Register*, 31 July 1988 (contrasting to an estimated 60 percent of the population who were Latino).

65. *Los Angeles Times*, 12 Jan. 1986, 7.

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